This paper tests the empirical predictions of recent theories of the endogenous entry of bidders in auctions. Data come from a field experiment, involving sealed-bid auctions for collectible trading cards over the Internet. Manipulating the reserve prices in the auctions as an experimental treatment variable generates several results. First, observed participation behavior indicates that bidders consider their bid submission to be costly, and that bidder participation is indeed an endogenous decision. Second, the participation is more consistent with a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium than with a deterministic equilibrium. Third, the data reject the prediction that the profitmaximizing reserve price is greater than or equal to the auctioneer's salvage value for the good, showing instead that a zero reserve price provides higher expected profits in this case.
Introduction
The earliest theoretical models of auctions assumed a fixed number N of participating bidders, with the number commonly known to the auctioneer and the participating bidders. More recent models have relaxed this assumption, considering the possibility of costly bidder participation, so that the actual number of participating bidders is an endogenous variable in the model. In this paper, I use a field experiment, auctioning several hundred collectible trading cards in an existing market on the Internet, to test the assumptions and the predictions of models of auctions with endogenous entry.
I concentrate on three empirical questions in this paper. First, can an experiment turn up evidence of endogenous entry behavior in a real-world market? The answer to this question appears to be yes. Second, given the existence of endogenous entry, does the entry equilibrium appear to be better modeled as stochastic, or as deterministic? Evidence from the experiment indicates that the stochastic equilibrium concept is a better model of behavior. Third, is it possible to verify the theory of McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1998, henceforth, MQV) , that even with endogenous bidder entry, the optimal reserve price for the auctioneer to set is at least as great as the auctioneer's salvage value? The answer to this question is "no," as a reserve price of zero appears to provide higher expected profits than a reserve price at the auctioneer's salvage value.
The field-experiment methodology of this study, that of auctioning real goods in a preexisting market, represents a hybrid between traditional laboratory experiments and traditional field research which takes the data as given. It shares with laboratory experiments the important advantage of allowing the researcher to control certain variables of interest, rather than leaving the researcher subject to the vagaries of the actual marketplace. (The key experimental treatment in this paper is the manipulation of the reserve price across auctions, to observe how participants react in their entry and bidding decisions.) It shares with traditional field research the advantage of studying agents' behavior in a real-world environment, rather than in a more artificial laboratory setting.
Although the experimental literature on auctions is vast, 1 almost all of these studies have imposed an exogenous number of bidders (determined by the experimenter). Two exceptions are Levin and Smith (1995) and Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1996) . Levin and Smith (1995) design their experiment to determine whether the entry equilibrium which obtains is deterministic or stochastic, a question I also investigate in this paper. Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1996) show that when participation in a common-value auction is costly, winner's-curse effects are attenuated. The present paper adds to this literature on endogenous entry of bidders, examining behavior in a marketplace where bidders decide for themselves whether or not to bid in each advertised auction.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the relevant aspects of endogenous-entry auction theory, focusing on the testable implications. The third section describes the marketplace where the experiment took place, and explains the design of the experiment. The fourth section presents the results, and a fifth section concludes. fects as well. For example, Samuelson (1985) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) , making different modelling assumptions, both find that endogenous entry drives down the auctioneer's optimal reserve price relative to a model of costless entry. One of the goals of the present paper is to demonstrate that the existence of entry costs in a real-world auction market. McAfee and McMillan (1987) model bidder entry as a pure-strategy, asymmetric Nash equilibrium. In these models, exactly n bidders enter the auction (out of a total of N>n potential bidders), and n is determined endogenously from the other parameters of the model (the auction format, the degree of affiliation of bidder values, the cost of entry, and so on). Alternatively, others have modeled a mixed-strategy, symmetric entry equilibrium (Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) , Levin and Smith (1994) , MQV (1998) ). In the mixed-strategy models, bidders each enter with probability ρ, where ρ is determined endogenously. 2 Levin and Smith (1994) point out that the difference between pure-strategy (deterministic) models and mixed-strategy (stochastic) ones has implications for social welfare: if entry is stochastic, then expected social surplus is decreasing in the number N of potential bidders. The reason is that the variance of the number n of actual entrants is increasing in N, and such variance is costly.
In common-value auctions, then, it turns out that auctioneers can increase both social welfare and their own profits by using reserve prices to discourage entry.
In a separate paper, Levin and Smith (1995) perform an experiment in which they attempt to determine whether entry by bidders is stochastic or deterministic: they find evidence in favor of their stochastic hypothesis. However, the experimental procedure doesn't actually involve any auctions; rather, it assigns simulated auction payoffs by a lottery procedure. 3 The experiment has little to do with the auction institution; it is instead a more abstract study of people's behavior in entry games. 4 In this paper, I attempt to provide evidence on the question of stochastic versus deterministic entry equilibria in a richer auction environment.
MQV (1998) examine the effects of reserve prices where valuations are where bidder entry is endogenous and bidder valuations may be either affiliated. In their model, the auctioneer chooses a reserve price and announces her auction, together with the level of her reserve price, to N potential bidders. Bidders then decide whether or not to incur the participation costs, making a stochastic (mixed-strategy) entry decision. Next the participating bidders find out their private information about the value of the good, they submit their bids, and finally the auction award the good to the highest bidder. If no bidder chooses to enter and to bid at least the reserve price, then the auctioneer keeps the good for herself and earns some outside option utility, or "salvage value." The main prediction of MQV is that the optimal reserve price is at least as high as the salvage value of the good. This is a testable prediction; raising the reserve price from some lower value to the expected salvage value of the good should raise revenues for the auctioneer.
3 Subjects made the decision whether or not to incur the cost c to enter. After the entry outcome was observed, each of the n entrants had a 1/n chance of winning the payoff for that round of the experiment. 4 In addition, I believe that this design may have biased the experiment towards finding a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium. Since the simple yes/no entry decision was the only opportunity a subject had to influence his payoff in the experiment, subjects might have decided to mix up their entry decisions at random merely to relieve the boredom of the experiment. If the auctions had actually been held, then perhaps the subjects would have learned something about the other subjects' bidding behavior. Then skillful bidders might have learned to continue entering consistently in subsequent rounds, while unskillful bidders might have learned to stay out; such behavior has been observed in experiments by Cox, Dinkin, and Smith (1996) .
Levin and Smith argue that two effects actually bias their experiment away from finding a mixed-strategy entry equilibrium. One is that heterogeneity in risk preferences would cause more risk-averse bidders deterministically to stay out of the auction, while less risk-averse bidders would deterministically stay in. I would argue to the extent that risk-preference heterogeneity matters, it is also likely to matter in real-world auctions, and therefore this does not bias this laboratory experiment as compared with other auction environments. Their other argument is that repeated play could allow bidders to signal each other and coordinate to avoid the inefficiencies associated with stochastic entry. However, as such efficiency gains are rather small, they may not be sufficient to induce coordination among bidders who may also have tastes to avoid boredom.
To summarize, this paper will attempt to answer three main questions. First, are entry costs relevant in the Internet auction market where I ran my experiments? Second, is the entry equilibrium a deterministic or a stochastic one? Third, is the optimal reserve price at least as high as the auctioneer's salvage value? Note that the first question is about an assumption of endogenous-entry, the second attempts to distinguish between two rival theories, and the third is a test of the empirical prediction of a specific model.
Experimental Design
For this experiment, I auctioned trading cards via first-price, sealed-bid auctions, varying the reserve prices across treatments. The data in this paper are the same as in Lucking-Reiley (1999) .
The experiments took place in a fascinating new market that sprang up on the Internet: a market for collectible cards from the game Magic: the Gathering, a game which has enjoyed great success since its launch in August 1993. In the game scenario, players assume the roles of dueling wizards, each with their own libraries of magic spells (represented by decks of cards) that may potentially be used against one's opponent. Cards are sold in random assortments, just like baseball cards, at retail stores ranging from small game and hobby shops to large chains such as Toys 'R' Us and Waldenbooks. More than a thousand distinct types of cards have been printed for use in the game, each of which plays a slightly different role.
Soon after the introduction of Magic, Internet users formed a newsgroup (rec.games.deckmaster) devoted to the discussion of this new game. In addition to discussions about the rules of the game and strategies for constructing decks, many of the messages on this newsgroup were buy, sell, and trade offers for individual cards. The terms of trade were agreed to via electronic mail, and then the transactions were carried out through postal mail. Messages devoted to economic trades soon overwhelmed the discussion group, so within a few months a new group (rec.games.deckmaster.marketplace, later renamed rec.games.trading-cards.marketplace) was devoted exclusively to the trading of these cards.
Both the quantity and the variety of messages posted to this newsgroup were stunning. In the spring of 1995, there were nearly 6,000 messages being posted each week, making rec.games.trading-cards.marketplace the highest-volume newsgroup on the entire Internet. According to the April Approximately 90% of the 26,000 messages per month were devoted to the trading of Magic cards, with the remaining 10% devoted to the trading of cards from other games which have followed Magic into the booming market. The newsgroup employed several different kinds of market mechanisms. Some people posted cards they are willing to trade, along with "wish lists" of cards they would be willing to accept in return, soliciting responses via private electronic mail. Others post fixed prices at which they are willing to sell cards for cash. Many hopeful sellers conducted auctions of their unwanted cards, and there were a plethora of different auction mechanisms coexisting simultaneously. Some auctioneers held English-style auctions, and a small number held first-price sealed-bid auctions. I even saw one example of a Dutch auction, in which prices fall over time until the winner finally submits the first bid. Some auctioneers utilized public reserve prices, while others did not.
Why do people participate in this market? The trading of Magic cards has become just as enthralling an activity for some people as the actual playing of the game. Indeed, one's enjoyment of the game depends critically on the composition of one's deck, so players often work hard to find just the card they're looking for. A player will typically have several different decks on hand, each of which has been designed and optimized with specific strategies in mind. In addition to game play, many Magic enthusiasts also collect the cards as one might collect baseball cards. Thus, players have different needs for different cards: a particular card might help fine-tune one player's deck, or complete part of another player's collection. Scarcity is one major determinant of transaction prices for cards, as some cards are printed in relatively low quantities, and some cards have gone out of print. The most common cards are not worth trading over the Internet; their values are pennies or less. Cards designated "uncommon" but not "rare" trade for prices of ten cents to two dollars. Cards designated "rare" but still in print typically range in price from one to fifteen dollars.
Out-of-print cards, depending on their initial scarcity and on other attributes, can trade for as much as three hundred dollars. In this research project, I dealt only in out-of-print cards.
One card trader wrote a computer program that automatically searches the marketplace newsgroup for each instance of each card name (with some tolerance for misspellings) and gathers data on the prices posted next to each card name in the newsgroup messages. It then computes trimmed means, standard deviations, quantiles, and so on, and automatically places this data on the Internet as a public service for other interested traders. The Cloister price list, as it is known, is recomputed on a weekly basis, with each week's list archived for public use. Each card's list price is the trimmed mean of hundreds or thousands of different observations on the newsgroup; such observations can be auctions in progress (some with very low prices), from consummated trades, or from advertised retail prices that never actually result in trades (often with very high prices). Despite the variability of the underlying observations, people have found the computed Cloister prices to be a reliable measure of card value, and many people have adopted the Cloister list as a standard price reference. I make use of these Cloister prices in my analysis.
This marketplace represented an exciting opportunity to run auction field experiments. For the experiments, I purchased several thousand dollars' worth of cards (also via the Internet), and auctioned them off while systematically manipulated the reserve prices in order to observe their effects on bidder participation and bidding behavior. Since in any given week there were dozens of auctioneers holding Magic auctions on the Internet, as an experimenter I was able to be a "small player" who did not significantly perturb the overall market.
I employed two distinct experimental designs to collect the data. The first design examines the effects of a binary variable: whether or not minimum bids were used. By auctioning the same cards twice, once with and once without minimum bids, it exploits within-card variation to find the effects of the treatment variable on bidding and entry behavior. The second design investigates the effects of a continuous variable: the reserve price level (expressed as a fraction of the Cloister reference price). The between-card variation provides information that can be used to test the MQV prediction about the optimal reserve price level.
Within-Card Experiments
The first part of the data collection consisted of two pairs of auctions. Each of the four auctions was a sealed-bid, first-price auction of several dozen individual Magic cards auctioned off individually. This simultaneous auction of many different goods at once, although not common in other economic environments, 5 is the norm for auctions of Magic cards on the Internet. Running auc-tions in this simultaneous-auction format thus made the experiment as realistic and natural as possible for the bidders, who see many other similar auctions in the Internet marketplace for cards.
Each auction lasted for one week, from the time the auction was announced to the deadline by which all bids had to be received. I announced each auction to potential bidders via two channels.
First, I posted three announcements to the appropriate Internet newsgroup. For each auction, I posted a total of three newsgroup messages spaced evenly over the course of the week of the auction. Second, I solicited some bidders directly via email messages to their personal electronic mailboxes. My mailing list for direct solicitation was comprised of people who had already demonstrated their interest in participating in auctions for Magic cards by participation in previous ones.
The paired-auction experiment proceeded as follows. First, I held an absolute auction (no minimum bid) for 86 different cards (one of each card in the Antiquities expansion set). The subject line of the announcement read "Reiley's Auction #4: ANTIQUITIES, 5 Cent Minimum, Free Shipping!" so that potential bidders might be attracted by the unusually low minimum bid per card, essentially zero. (A 5-cent minimum is effectively no minimum, since the auction rules also required all bids to be in integer multiples of a nickel.) After the one-week deadline for submitting bids had passed, I computed the highest bid on each card. To each bidder who had won one or more cards, I mailed (electronically) a bill for the total amount owed. 6 After receiving a winner's payment via check or money order, I mailed them their cards. Almost no one defaulted on their winning bids. 7 I also mailed a list of the winning bids to each bidder who had participated in the auction, whether or not they had won cards. This represented an effort to maintain my reputation as a credible auctioneer, demonstrating my truthfulness to those who had participated. I did not, however,
give the bidders any explicit information about the number of people who had participated in the auction, or about the number of people who had received email invitations to participate.
After one additional week of buffer time after the end of the first auction, I ran the second auction in the paired experiment, this time with reasonably high minimum bid levels on each of the same 86 cards as before. The minimum bid levels were determined by consulting the standard (trimmed-mean) Cloister price list of Magic cards cited in section 3 of this paper, and setting the minimum bid level for each card equal to 90% of the value of that card from the price list.
This contrast in minimum bid levels (zero versus 90% of the Cloister price list) was the only economically significant difference between the two auctions. 8 By keeping all other conditions identical between the two auctions, I attempted to isolate the effects of minimum bids on potential bidders' behavior. One condition that could not be kept identical, unfortunately, was the time period during which the auction took place. Because the two auctions took place two weeks apart, there were potential differences between the auctions that might have affected bidder behavior.
First, the demands for the cards (or the supplies by other auctioneers) might have changed system-atically over time, which is a realistic possibility in such a fast-changing market as this one. 9 Second, since the auctions shared many of the same bidders in common, the results of the first auction may have affected the demand for the cards sold in the second auction. 10 To control for such potential variations in conditions over time, I simultaneously ran the same experiment in reverse order, using a different sample of cards. This second pair of auctions each featured the 78 cards in the Arabian Nights expansion set, with minimum bids present in the first auction but absent in the second. Just as before, minimum bids were set at ninety percent of the market price level from the Cloister price list. The first auction in this pair began three days after the start of the first auction in the previous pair, so that the auctions in the two experiments overlapped in time but were offset by three days. Also, I used a larger mailing list for my email announcement in this pair of auctions (232 people) than I had for the previous pair of auctions (50 people), with the first mailing list being a subset of the second mailing list. Otherwise, all other conditions were identical between the two pairs of auctions. A sample auction announcement, as it appeared to the potential bidders both in electronic mail and in the marketplace newsgroup, is displayed in the Appendix. Table 1 shows a set of summary statistics for each of the four auctions in the within-card experiments. 11 The auctions are displayed in two pairs: first Auctions AA and AR, for the 86 Antiquities cards, and then Auctions BA and BR, for the 78 Arabian Nights cards. 12 Auctions AA and BA were with no minimum bids, while Auctions AR and BR had sizable minimums (equal to 90% of the market price).
The table contains quite a bit of descriptive information about the auctions, including the number of participating bidders, the number of bids received, and the total payments received from winning bidders. I wish to single out two key points. First, "real money" was involved in the auction transactions. Of the 73 different bills I sent to winning bidders over the course of the experiment, the median payment amount for each auction was between $10 and $24. A few individual payments even exceeded $100.
Second, in each auction there are multiple winners. The number of winners in each auction ranges from 6 to 27, and the fraction of bidders who win at least one card is between 40 percent and 86 percent. In each auction, the median number of cards won by each winner is between 2 and 3.5, while the maximum number of cards won by a single bidder ranges from 12 to 26. Except in Auction AR, no winner won more than 29 percent of the cards sold in any single auction. (In Auction AR, participation was very low: only 7 people submitted bids, 6 of whom won at least one card, 11 A note on mnemonics. The first letter represents the card set: A for Antiquities, B for Arabian Nights. The second letter is A for an absolute auction (reserve prices equal to zero), and R for an auction with positive reserve prices.
These auctions were part of a series of auctions run for a larger research program, so participating bidders saw me run several other auctions (not part of the research presented here) during this same time period. This had two advantages where the experimental design is concerned. First, it helped avoid drawing bidders' attention to the point of my research. (For example, during this time period I also ran an English auction and a second-price auction and another first-price auction, with different sets of cards.) I feared that if they knew I was looking for the effects of reserve prices, it might distort their behavior (for example, they might consciously try to bid consistently from one auction to another). Second, it had the effect of making bidders unsure what I will do next. In particular, I didn't want bidders to expect that I would always auction the same card twice, for it might distort their behavior if they knew they would have a second chance to bid on the same card.
I added a large number of names to my mailing list between the A pair of auctions and the B pair of auctions when a new list of names became available to me; it was important to me to keep up my stock of participating bidders, both to maintain high levels of individual bidding data and to maintain high revenues. Most of the additions to my list turned out not be interested in my auctions; they were subsequently dropped from the list. The number of potential bidders was not a variable of primary interest in this study, though in future work I intend to explore the effects of the number of invited bidders on the optimal reserve price.
12 A few of the auction items I denote as "cards" were actually groups of cards: either a sealed packet of outof-print cards, or a set of common cards bundled together. and 39 of the cards went unsold.) The biggest spender in any of the auctions won cards totalling $316.50 of the total revenue of $774.75 in Auction BA, generating 41 percent of the revenue despite winning no more than 15 percent of the cards -evidently, she was particularly interested in high-value cards. Thus, it is not the case that some people are the highest bidders on all cards in an auction, which suggests that a given bidder's valuations for different cards are at least somewhat independent. This gives some justification for reporting regression results in which each individual card bid is assumed to be an independent observation.
Between-Card Experiments
A second set of experiments was designed to examine the effects of changes in the level of the reserve price, rather than merely changes in the existence of reserve prices. Five first-price, sealedbid auctions took place, each with a one-week timeframe for the submission of bids. Each was a simultaneous auction of many different items, this time with no overlap of items between auctions.
Each card in the first four auctions (R1 through R4) had a posted reserve price. The fifth auction (R0) used a zero reserve price on every card, in order to provide a basis for comparison. 13 Just as before, I announced each auction via three posts to the relevant newsgroup, as well as via email to a list of bidders. 14 In the first four auctions, I auctioned 99 different cards each time, setting a reserve price for each card as a particular fraction of the current Cloister price of that card. In each of the first two auctions, nine cards were auctioned at a minimum bid of 10 percent of the Cloister price, nine at 20 percent, nine at 30 percent, and so on, up to a maximum of 110 percent of the Cloister price. For each reserve-price level, I chose an assortment of different cards with widely different Cloister prices, and scattered the group randomly across the complete list of cards. After an analysis of the data from those auctions, I chose to collect more data both at very low and at very high reserve price levels. Therefore, the third and fourth auctions were designed to have equal numbers of cards auctioned at reserve levels of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140 , and 150 percent of the Cloister price. 15 This variation in reserve price levels was designed to investigate how both bidder behavior and expected auction revenue would react to changes in the reserve price, and to calculate the optimal reserve price level. Normalizing by the Cloister price, since this is a standard reference price computed in the same way for all Magic cards, makes cross-card comparisons feasible. Besides the exceptions noted above, all experimental protocols and bidder instructions were kept identical to those used in the auctions with reserve prices in the experimental design described in section 4.1.
Summary statistics for the between-card auctions are given in Table 3 . In auctions R1 to R4, reserve prices ranged from 0% to 150% of each individual card's Cloister value, and the average reserve price level varied slightly from auction to auction, from 60% to 85%. In auction R0, of course, the average reserve price level was zero.
As can be seen in the table, each auction had dozens of bidders and hundreds of bids on individual cards. The number of people receiving email invitations to participate declined with each successive auction, but only due to recipients asking to be removed from my mailing list, so the changes in the mailing list should not have affected the number of potential participants. Note that the data from the between-card auctions is not directly comparable to that from the within-card 15 In practice, the number of cards at each reserve-price level ended up not being precisely equal. Because I required bids to be in multiples of $0.05, I always took the computed reserve price and rounded it down to the nearest acceptable bid amount. In the analysis below, I take the ratio of the actual reserve price used to the Cloister price, and round to the nearest 10% level in order to examine the effects of the reserve price on expected revenue. This results in unequal numbers of cards at the different levels of reserve prices.
auctions, because the size and composition of the pool of participating bidders changed considerably during the intervening six months. Very few bidders overlapped between the two experiments; most of the bidders in the between-card experiment were new recruits.
The table also displays some aggregate statistics on revenue, including the total Cloister value of all the cards in each auction, the total revenue earned on cards which were sold, and a grandtotal revenue figure which also includes the salvage value of the unsold cards. The auction revenue in each case was reasonably close to the total Cloister value of the cards; in Auction R2 I earned revenue greater than the total Cloister value, while in the three others I earned slightly less.
Results
I now present the results from the experiment, separately for each of the three empirical questions outlined above. Are entry costs relevant? Is the entry equilibrium stochastic or deterministic? Do the auctioneer's profits improve as he raises the reserve price to be at least as high as his salvage value?
Entry costs are relevant
The within-card experiments demonstrate that endogenous bidder entry appears to be the right model for this market. Statistics on the number of card bids per participating bidder are shown in Table 2 . As expected, individual bidders tend to submit fewer bids in the presence of minimums than they do in the absence of minimums. This does not in itself demonstrate the existence of bidding costs; a bidder who contemplates how much to bid and then decides that the reserve price exceeds his maximum willingness could still be counted as having "participated," because the decision cost would already have been incurred even though the reserve price prevents me from observing a low bid. In the auctions with minimums, no single bidder submitted bids on even half of the cards; the maximum number of bids by a single bidder was 30. By contrast, there were bidders in both of the no-minimum auctions who submitted individual bids on every single card.
Interestingly, relatively few bidders followed this strategy of bidding on every single card in the absolute (no-minimum) auctions. Only one out of 19 bidders bid on every single item in Auction AA, and only six of 62 bidders bid on every single item in Auction BA. These statistics indicate that the cost of submitting a bid (the participation cost) is high enough to affect bidder behavior, and thus this experimental environment is appropriate for exploring endogenous-entry bidding models such as MQV. If there were no cost to submitting a bid, then one would expect to see all of the participating bidders submitting bids on every card (as low as a nickel, say), since every card does have some positive resale value even to people who get no consumption utility from it. 16 I conclude that bidders deem the probability of getting a bargain (and thus a resale profit) on such a card is low enough that the expected profit from bidding does not always outweigh the cost of having to decide on a bid amount and to type the approximately ten characters required to submit another card bid. Indeed, the median number of card bids submitted by a single bidder was only 13 (of a possible 87) in Auction AA, and 14 (of a possible 78) in Auction BA, even though these auctions had no minimum bids.
Thus, bidders do appear to make a participation decision consistent with the existence of small entry costs; the number of participating bidders in each auction is not exogenous. The classical theory makes some accurate predictions about the effects of reserve prices, as shown earlier, despite this violation of its assumptions.
Is the entry equilibrium stochastic or deterministic?
Given the existence of endogenous entry, I now ask: is the entry equilibrium deterministic or stochastic? Very few bidders bid on a card both times it was offered, despite the fact that the same people were invited each time. Nineteen and seven bidders, respectively, bid in the two Antiquities auctions, but only 4 people overlapped between the two auctions. In the Arabian Nights auctions, there were 42 and 62 bidders, but only 17 of the bidders overlapped between the two. Thus, in each pair of auctions, there were a proportionally large number people who entered the first auction but not the second, and other people who entered the second auction but not the first. This argues in favor of a stochastic equilibrium, as the most natural kind of deterministic equilibrium is one in which the same bidders enter each time.
Two objections might be raised to the result just presented. First, it might be the case that people enter one auction but not the other because the latter auction has reserve prices which are higher than they are willing to pay. However, this screening-out explanation cannot account for the bidders who bid in the presence of reserve prices but fail to bid in the absence of reserve prices; there were 3 such bidders in the Antiquities auctions, and 25 such bidders in the Arabian Nights auctions.
The second potential objection is that bidders may have bid in the chronologically first auction, but not the second, in a pair because they had already bought the cards by the time the second auction occurred. This complaint potentially affects the 25 Arabian Nights bidders just cited, who bid in Auction BR but not in Auction BA. Indeed, three of these bidders each placed a bid on a single card in Auction BR and won it, so there would be no reason to expect them to bid in the second auction. However, none of the remaining 22 bidders won all the cards they bid on in Auction BR: ten did not win any cards at all, while the remaining twelve won an average of 50 percent of the cards they bid on. It is still possible that these bidders managed to purchase the rest of the cards they were interested in from someone else during the week that passed between my two auctions, but I can at least say that they did not buy them from me. Thus, the evidence is fairly strong that bidders in these auctions made stochastic entry decisions: faced with the same auction opportunity, the same person might sometimes enter and sometimes fail to enter.
This stochastic entry decision might not be due to conscious randomization by an bidder trying to follow a "mixed strategy" in the textbook sense. Perhaps bidders enter "randomly" because of other things happening in their lives: a college student had too much homework one week, or a computer programmer had a family emergency. Lots of random events could cause bidders to show up to one auction but not another. However, in terms of auction design and welfare considerations, what matters is whether the entry decisions in a real-world auction are deterministically predictable by the auctioneer and by the rival bidders. My evidence shows that at least in this market, bidder entry decisions are stochastic, so the model of Levin and Smith (1994) has empirical relevance.
Optimal Reserve Price with Endogenous Entry
Recall that the main prediction of the MQV paper is that raising the reserve price from some low value to the salvage value of the good will increase expected auction profits, even in an endogenous-entry context. In order to understand the effect of the reserve price on expected revenues, I
turn to the between-card experimental data. Recall that these data provide samples of auction revenues at differing reserve price levels (normalized by Cloister price for each card). Table X summarizes the results of the experiment separately for each reserve-price decile, from reserve prices of 0% of the Cloister price to reserve prices of 150% of the Cloister price. The table displays the total number of cards I auctioned at each reserve price, the number of those which went unsold, and the mean and standard deviation of the revenues at each reserve price level. The revenues are also normalized by the Cloister price of each card, and an unsold card counts as an ob-servation of zero revenue. The data are displayed graphically in Figure 1 , with the mean revenues plotted against the reserve prices. The error bars show one standard error in each direction (where the standard error equals the standard deviation in revenues for that reserve price level divided by the square root of the number of observations at that reserve price level). We see that the revenues are quite high at a reserve price of zero, then drop off sharply at a reserve price of 10% of Cloister price. Revenues seem to rise again, generally, between 50% and 100% of the Cloister price, then fall again at higher reserve price levels. There are surprisingly high revenues observed at 140% ot 150% of the Cloister price, albeit with high standard errors.
To test the MQV prediction also requires an estimate of the salvage value for the unsold cards. Now the question is whether a reserve price equal to the salvage value yields expected profits at least as high as a reserve price less than the salvage value (0% or 10%) of salvage value. The point estimates of revenues certainly indicate that the opposite is the case. In order to perform a formal hypothesis test, first I calculate expected profits rather than expected revenues. For the 0% reserve price, all cards sold, so profits remain the same as revenues: 1.192. For the 20% reserve price, two cards went unsold; when I count salvage profits of 20% of Cloister price for each of these cards, the estimate of expected profit rises slightly, from 0.857 to 0.870. Using the calculated standard deviations, I conduct a test of the null hypothesis of equality between expected profits at 0% reserve price and expected profits at 20% reserve price. The resulting standard normal test statistic is 2.18, with a p-value of 0.029. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis of equality at the 5% level of significance, and conclude that expected profits are actually higher for a zero reserve price than they are for a reserve price equal to the salvage value. 18 This is a violation of the theoretical prediction, an example of a case in which the auctioneer does better to hold an auction with a zero reserve price than to set the reserve price equal to the salvage value. One possible explanation is that an auction with no reserve price generates more enthusiasm among bidders, causing higher levels of participation. In other words, modest minimum bids may eliminate some high valuation-bidders, who would have bid high if they had participated, but decide not to participate unless their attention is attracted by an auction with zero minimum bids. Although a few items may end up being sold at very low prices, they might serve as "loss leaders," similar to the goods advertised at deep discounts by supermarkets, enabling the auctioneer to collect higher revenues overall. This proposed effect involves increased entry through attracting bidders' attention,with the absolute auction as a type of promotion, rather than assuming the bidders will make a careful calculation of the costs versus the benefits of bidding. Note in Table X that the total number of bidders in Auction R0 is actually lower than in the other auctions, which might seem to be evidence against this effect, although I should also note that the number of cards in auction R0 is also lower than in the auctions with reserve prices. One caveat about this finding is that most of the zero-reserve-price cards were sold in the same auction (R0). Although I did attempt to keep all other variables constant across auctions, the anomaly might be due to some uncontrolled factor which was different between R0 and the earlier auctions.
Conclusions
This study presents the results of controlled experimental auctions performed in a field environment. By auctioning real goods in a preexisting, natural auction market, I have obtained data in a manner that is intermediate between laboratory experiments and traditional studies of field data. Some variables were unfortunately unobservable and uncontrolled -for example, I could not assign "valuations" for each good to each bidder, as a laboratory experimentalist might. On the other hand, I have the opportunity to hold constant most of the relevant variables in the environment, and to manipulate the treatment variable, which in this case was the existence and level of reserve prices. By giving up the ability to observe and manipulate some of variables that laboratory experimenters can control, I gained a very realistic environment. The participants had previous experience bidding for the types of real goods I auctioned, and the auctions took place in an Internetbased market where bidder entry decisions seemed potentially important.
The first result is that entry costs are indeed an important feature of this real-world auction markets, thus confirming the central assumption of endogenous-entry auction theory. The costs in the Magic-card market are probably not nearly as dramatic as those postulated in other markets (for example, in the market for offshore oil rights the bidders typically hire geologists to perform extensive analysis of the potential for oil in a given tract). Here, the cost of acquiring information about individual cards is quite small, but even the cost of typing in a bid amount appears to have observable effects.
Second, I considered the question of which equilibrium model is the more realistic description of auction entry equilibrium: a pure-strategy deterministic equilibrium, or a mixed-strategy stochastic equilibrium. When the same cards were auctioned twice in rapid succession, very different sets of people decided to submit bids, despite the fact that the same superset of people were invited to participate both times. This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of the stochastic entry equilibrium model, where the number of participating bidders varies unpredictably.
Third, I showed that, contrary to the theory of McAfee, Quan, and Vincent (1998) , a zero reserve price can earn higher expected profits than a reserve price equal to the auctioneer's salvage value. One possible explanation is that an absolute auction attracts significantly more bidder attention than an auction with even modest reserve prices, causing more additional entry than might be suggested by a model of rationally calculated bidder entry decisions. It will be interesting to see whether this finding can be replicated in other auction markets.
The field-experiment methodology employed in this paper holds promise for future research on auctions. With the recent, rapid development of online auctions on the World Wide Web should come additional opportunities for auction field experiments that complement laboratory research on auction markets. Samuelson, William F. "Competitive Bidding with Entry Costs," Economics Letters, 1985, vol. 17, pp. 53-57 . This will be a SEALED-BID, FIRST-PRICE AUCTION. Here's how it works:
I will accept all bids up until the deadline of NOON (Eastern Standard Time), next TUESDAY, March 7, 1995. All bids are "sealed" in the sense that I will not post updates or otherwise reveal information about the highest bid until the auction is over.
After the deadline for bids has passed, I will award each card to the highest bidder at the price of their bid. The exception is that if no one bid at least the posted minimum bid for some card, that card will not be sold.
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1. Submit bids via email to <reiley@mit.edu>. Make sure that the subject line of your email contains the phrase "Auction #5". (Simply using the "reply" command on most mail and news programs should work just fine.) If your message does not contain this text in the subject line, your message will be discarded.
2. In your email message, please put each of your bids on a separate line of text. Each bid line should be in the following format: the 3-digit identification number of the card you're bidding on, immediately followed by a right parenthesis, and then the amount of your bid in dollars and cents (such as 1.00). For example: 305) 2.00 306) 0.65
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Bids that do not conform to these rules will be discarded. 3. All bids must be in integer multiples of a nickel ($0.05), in US currency. Tuesday, March 7, 1995, at noon (EST) . Any bids received after that time will be ignored. All cards receiving a bid of at least the posted minimum bid will be sold at that point to the highest bidder. In the case of a tie, the winner will be the person whose bid was received first.
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6. The winning bidder will be notified by email, and will be asked to pay the amount of his/her bid via US check or money order.
7. This payment will include free shipping within the United States, via first class mail. The cards will be wrapped in plastic sheaths and packed in cardboard for protection. All cards will be shipped within one week after the receipt of payment.
8. While this is a real auction for real cards, you should know that I plan to use data on the bids in this auction for economic research. In no case will individual bidders be identified in this research; anonymity will be preserved. By bidding in this auction, you indicate your consent to have your bid be used in economic research. If you do not approve of this, you have the right not to participate in this auction. Should you have any questions or concerns about the use of data from this auction in academic research, please contact the chair of the COUHES committee at MIT by phone at 617-253-6787.
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